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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

YOU GOTTA HAVE FAITH: GOOD FAITH IN THE CONTEXT OF
DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE FUTURE IMPACT
ON CORPORATE CULTURE

I. INTRODUCTION
“The point is, ladies and gentlemen, greed is good. Greed works, greed is
right. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the
evolutionary spirit. Greed in all its forms, greed for life, money, love,
knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind[,] and greed . . . will
save . . . the USA.”1 These are the immortal words of Gordon Gekko, the
corporate raider from the movie Wall Street whose insatiable greed eventually
led to his fall from spectacular wealth to an equally spectacular demise. Gekko
represents the premier capitalist who reached his fabulous position in
America’s elite through deceitful and illegal schemes. Such a story is
entertaining in the gleam of Hollywood, but what happens when reality mimics
the movies?
Over the past few years corporate scandals have rocked the very core of
the American capitalist system and have raised many questions regarding
proper corporate governance. Everyone remembers the highly publicized
financial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and
Enron, which ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion.2 However, these
particular scandals represent only a small portion of the corporations that have
been investigated for dishonesty and fraud. In fact, since the Enron scandal
broke in 2000, sixty-one companies have been investigated for their
indiscretions.3
Corrupt officials who looted their companies of assets and opportunities
fueled many of these companies’ falls from the highest echelon of American
corporations. Meanwhile the companies’ boards of directors buried their heads
in the sand, unwilling to prod into the destructive behavior of the top officials
that was crippling the very company that shareholders had entrusted the

1. WALL STREET (Oaxatal Productions, Inc. 1987), available at http://allmoviescripts.com/
scripts/7622567143f65e0111fbe9.html.
2. See David L. Cotton, Fixing CPA Ethics Can Be an Inside Job, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
2002, at B2.
3. See CITIZEN WORKS, THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET, at http://www.citizen
works.org/corp/corp-scandal.php. THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET provides a synopsis of each
of the corporate scandals and the catalysts that caused them.
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directors to monitor. As a result, large numbers of employees lost their jobs
and company shareholders lost hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth.
There has been a marked shift within the courts during the past few years
to focus on the good faith of corporate directors. This shift is perhaps a direct
corollary to the inappropriate directorial conduct that fueled the recent
collapses of several Fortune 500 companies. In recent cases, the court system
has warned directors that such egregious conduct will not be tolerated and will
expose the directors to personal liability.
Originally, the duties of care and loyalty subsumed the duty of good faith.4
However, Delaware and other states have recently enacted new provisions that
have thrust the duty of good faith into the limelight as the central focus in a
court’s fiduciary duty inquiry. These provisions have substantially lessened
the presence of directors’ fiduciary duties and the inherent potential exposure
to personal liability. However, an integral component within each of these
protective statutes is the concept of good faith.
Recent cases have made it clear that a lack of good faith will take a
director’s conduct out of the protection of both the business judgment rule and
the protective provisions. The courts have put directors on notice that a lack of
good faith will expose them to personal liability. In addition, although not
discussed in great detail in this Comment, the good-faith standard is a key
component in the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed listing
requirements of self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE and
NASDAQ.5
In addition to recent statutory developments in Delaware, the courts and
Congress have also made efforts to enhance the scrutiny on director conduct.
While some commentators have characterized such moves as a drastic shift in
the way the legislative and judicial branches approach corporate conduct, these
measures are more properly viewed as a wake-up call in response to the recent
deplorable conduct of several directors and top officials that has recently come
into the public consciousness. Despite the increased scrutiny, the business
judgment rule continues to drape a security blanket over business decisions,
encouraging bold entrepreneurialism and risk-taking, a centerpiece for
American business.
This Comment will discuss the standards set forth in several landmark
cases in the past fifty years such as Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.,6 Smith v. Van Gorkom,7 Aronson v. Lewis,8 and In re Caremark
4. Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Takeovers
and Mergers, 1388 PLI/CORP 911, 918 (2003).
5. E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance
Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135, 2144 (2003).
6. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
7. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
8. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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International Inc. Derivative Litigation.9 These cases show the evolution in
director expectations and the good-faith principle that has led to the shift in
focusing on directors’ good faith, which is evident in the recent cases of
McCall v. Scott,10 In re the Abbot Laboratories Derivative Shareholders
Litigation,11 and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation. 12
Ultimately, the goal of the array of new measures put into place in
response to the recent corporate scandals is to increase the involvement and
accountability of corporate directors. Bill Donaldson, Chairman of the SEC,
recently expressed the aspirations of Congress and the courts that “in the [end]
it’s going to be the human characteristic” that regains trust in the corporate
culture and the markets.13 In a recent article, Delaware Chief Justice E.
Norman Veasey noted that directors are currently expected to be “skeptical,
probe, ask questions, and put management to its proof.”14 Furthermore, Chief
Justice Veasey articulates that a director must embody the qualities of
“integrity, expertise, diligence, good faith, independence and professionalism”
and maintain “a coherent economic rationale dedicated to the best interests of
stockholders.”15
This Comment is divided into five parts, the first of which will outline the
business judgment rule and the fiduciary duties. This section will demonstrate
the deference that courts give to business decisions and the reluctance of the
judiciary to second-guess directors’ judgment. Secondly, the Comment will
show the progression of the good-faith principle, both in the context of judicial
analyses of fiduciary duty and through the enhanced scrutiny associated with
takeovers. Next, it will focus on three recent cases that applied the good-faith
concept in taking director conduct outside the protection of not only the
business judgment rule but also out of the safety of new exculpatory
provisions. Part Four will demonstrate how the focus on the good faith of the
director is consistent with the purpose of the business judgment rule and how
good faith promotes business by deferring to director decisions absent
egregious conduct. Finally, this Comment will focus on the potential impact
that the good-faith analysis could have in future litigation and the corporate
culture.

9. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
10. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
11. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
12. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
13. Deborah Solomon, SEC Acts to Give Audit Panels More Power Over Accountants,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2003, at C5.
14. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2146.
15. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 445 (2003).
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II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS EFFECT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
The directors of a corporation are responsible for directing the
management and affairs of everyday business. These duties are an integral
component in maintaining an effective and profitable company. In many
circumstances, directors face decisions that they are not intimately informed
about, and have limited, if any, expertise. These tough decisions, however,
must be made in order for a business to prosper in the market and thrive
against competition. In such situations, directors will likely be called on to
weigh the corporate policies and goals in making the most profitable business
decision.16 A good director is generally one who can consider the needs of a
business on one hand; the risks involved in meeting those needs on the other;
and somehow create a viable balance of the two that will create a long-term
strategy for the corporation to succeed.17 If a director fails to use the requisite
care in making appropriate judgments in the best interests of the shareholder,
she could be subject to a derivative suit brought by the disadvantaged
shareholders.
A.

Shareholder Derivative Suits

Shareholders have an important right to bring a derivative action on the
company’s behalf to recoup assets from a director in retribution for any
improper conduct. When investors purchase stock in a company they gain
contractual rights to ownership; however, they entrust the directors to make
decisions in their best interest.18 One of the rights that a stockholder obtains
when she invests in a corporation through stock purchase is the ability to bring
a derivative suit against directors and officers on behalf of the corporation in
the event of wrongdoing.19 The plaintiff must assert particular facts that show
that a director breached his duties to the shareholder.20 A derivative suit
differs from other types of suits because even if the stockholder qualifies for
the privilege to litigate and ultimately wins the action, the award or equitable
relief will not benefit the individual shareholder; it will benefit the
16. See E. Norman Veasey & Julie M. S. Seitz, The Revised Model Business Corporation
Act: Comment and Observation: The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans
Union Case, and the ALI Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (1985).
Such tough decisions could include “acquisitions, sales of assets, entrance into new lines of
business, declaration of dividends, capital investment, incurring or avoiding debt, issuance of
stock, [and] mergers.” Id.
17. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
18. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 3 (3d ed. 2001).
19. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995).
20. Id. at 14.
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corporation.21 The derivative action is a very important aspect in corporate law
because most shareholder claims against directors take this form.22 A
formidable defense against such actions involves the directors’ assertion that
their actions are protected by the business judgment rule.
B.

The Business Judgment Rule

Reluctance toward second-guessing business decisions dates back more
than 250 years in English law to The Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,23 and the
1829 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Percy v. Millaudon24 instituted the
business judgment rule in American jurisprudence.25 Inherent in any business
decision is the assumption of risk, and the business judgment rule is a
presumption that protects a director from personal liability in shareholder
suits.26 The business judgment rule also shields directors in cases where a
shareholder seeks an injunction against a decision.27
Four points sum up the rationale and the necessity for the business
judgment rule in corporate law jurisprudence.28 First, the courts recognize that
even the most honest and well-intentioned director can make an improvident
decision.29 Second, the courts recognize the inherent risk involved in business
decisions; therefore, the rule alleviates the fear of judicial second-guessing and
allows the directors broad discretion in making company policy.30 Third, the
rule keeps courts from ruling on business decisions when they are less
equipped to handle such decisions than the directors.31 Finally, the business
judgment rule ensures that directors, and not shareholders, control the
corporation.32
The business judgment rule is basically an “uncodified equitable doctrine
to be applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis.”33 Delaware incorporates
the majority of corporations in the United States today; therefore, the Delaware
court system has developed substantial familiarity with issues relating to
21. See id. at 710.
22. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
23. 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
24. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
25. BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
26. Veasey & Seitz, supra note 16, at 1487.
27. Id.
28. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 7.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7–8.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at 10.
33. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 44. The American Bar Association did attempt to
codify the rule in § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act; however, it noted that the
court’s job was to “delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and the standards of
director conduct.” Id. at 44.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

576

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:571

corporate affairs and governance.34 Accordingly, when looking for guidance
on an issue regarding corporation law the first place to turn should be the
opinions of the Supreme Court of Delaware. One of the most classic and
enduring articulations of the business judgment rule is the 1927 decision of
Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.35 The Supreme Court of Delaware
expanded upon Bodell and has provided the most oft-cited expression of the
business judgment rule as “a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”36 If the conditions of the rule are met, the court will apply the rule
and not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless a plaintiff can show
that the directors breached their duties of care, loyalty, or good faith.37
A number of cases show the deference that courts give to director
decisions even when such decisions are imprudent. One example is Kamin v.
American Express Co.38 In Kamin, American Express acquired shares in a
corporation for around $30 million, only to sell the shares three years later for
$4 million.39 Instead of selling the shares on the open market at a loss, thereby
reducing tax liability by $8 million, American Express decided to distribute the
shares as a special dividend to shareholders to avoid the loss in net income.40
The distribution to shareholders had the effect of forfeiting the opportunity to
take the tax loss and could even be seen as wasting corporate assets. The
board, however, claimed that it was acting in the shareholders’ interests by
keeping reported earnings high.41 Despite the obvious foolishness of the
decision, the court upheld the directors’ ability to make an informed business
decision without judicial judgment, as long as the decision had been made in
good faith.42 The court refused to impose liability without a showing of selfdealing, even if the directors had made a mistake, or, in hindsight, the

34. Id. at 2.
35. 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927). The Bodell court articulates that the overall principle of the
business judgment rule is that a business decision will not be reviewed by the courts as long as
the acts of the directors “were performed in good faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and
for what they believe[] to be the advantage of the corporation and all its stockholders.” Id. at 268.
36. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
37. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001). The Cede court was the first to speak of the directors’
fiduciary duties as a “triad,” which included a duty of good faith along with duties of care and
loyalty. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
38. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
39. Id. at 809.
40. Id. at 809–10.
41. See id. at 811.
42. Id. at 812.
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shareholders would have preferred the directors to have taken a different
course of action.43
Although the courts have shown general deference to the decisions of
directors, they have differed in their articulation of what actions would fall
outside the rule’s protection.44 Some courts hold that no decision will be
second-guessed unless the judgment was “tainted by fraud, conflict of interest,
or illegality;” others say, “unless the alleged defect in the directors’ judgment
rises to the level of fraud;” or, “unless it rises to the level of gross
negligence.”45 Furthermore, courts have given certain board decisions, such as
dividend policies, decisions regarding what products to manufacture, or
personnel decisions, broad deference even beyond the generous boundaries of
the business judgment rule and do not subject them to judicial review no matter
how ill-advised.46
Despite the obvious implications to the business community, the courts are
quick to point out that the business judgment rule is a standard of judicial
review and is not meant to be a standard of business conduct.47 The rule is not
meant to be a guide for director’s conduct but instead serves as a defense
against judicial scrutiny assuming directors follow certain conditions.48 A
shareholder can rebut the rule in two ways, and the underlying notion is that
directors will not be liable for their decisions unless they breached their duties
of care or loyalty.49
1.

The Duty of Loyalty

The first way a shareholder can rebut the business judgment rule is to show
that a director made a decision specifically to further his own self-interest and
not for the shareholders’ benefit.50 In a famous opinion, the Michigan
Supreme Court pointed out that “[a] business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”51 Directors are
required to act, individually and as a group, in good faith and in the best
43. Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding
that the board will not be held liable just because they “may be mistaken, that other courses of
action might have differing consequences, or that their action might benefit some shareholders
more than others . . . so long as it appears that the directors [were] acting in good faith.”).
44. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986).
45. Id.
46. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2001).
47. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 3–4.
48. Id at 3.
49. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 291 (1994). Inherent in these fiduciary duties are the
requirements for a disinterested director to act with reasonable diligence and good faith. Id.
50. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 124.
51. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
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interests of the company, which is the duty of loyalty that is owed to the
shareholders.52 The duty of loyalty imposes personal liability if a director uses
his power for his own pecuniary benefit.53 At common law a transaction
involving conflicts of interest was void or voidable. Modern courts have been
more lenient, but they still require the self-dealing director to act with the
utmost good faith and scrupulous fairness.54 A director who has a financial or
personal interest in a transaction must disclose her interest and all the relevant
material facts to the board and then gain approval by a majority vote of
disinterested directors.55 The duty of loyalty also requires that a director give
the corporation a chance at a business opportunity before pursuing it herself.56
If a board, or individual member, fails to satisfy one of these requirements,
the director’s actions will be held to the more demanding review of the entire
fairness test.57 The court will then require the board to show that the decision
was a product of both fair price and fair dealing.58 The underlying principle of
the duty is that a director cannot personally prosper at the detriment of the
shareholders who have entrusted her with the well-being of the corporation. In
addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries have a duty of care to the
corporation and its shareholders.
2.

The Duty of Care

The second alternative available to the shareholder is to show that the
directors did not exercise sufficient care under the circumstances.59 The
obligation to make prudent business decisions usually involves consultation
with management and the strategic goals of the company.60 The directors owe
52. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 10. The duty requires that the
directors do not take advantage of the shareholders through fraudulent or unfair transactions. Id.
53. Id. The duty of loyalty can be divided into three subsections consisting of 1) interested
director transactions, 2) usurpation of corporate opportunity, and 3) executive compensation.
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 126.
54. Most state statutes allow a transaction involving a conflict of interest if it is approved by
a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders or if it is fair to the corporation. See BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 19, at 130–38.
55. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 10–11.
56. Id. at 11. Courts differ on the exact test to determine what constitutes a corporate
opportunity and the steps an employee must take before taking the opportunity for herself;
however, the bottom line is “that a corporate fiduciary should not serve both corporate and
personal interests at the same time.” Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146,
1150 (Me. 1995).
57. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
58. See id.; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). If the directors
fail to prove the intrinsic fairness of the transaction, they could be liable not only to compensate
the company and shareholders but also to rescind the transaction and pay damages. BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 19, at 17.
59. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 32.
60. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 3.
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a duty of care to the shareholders to act as a normally prudent person in the
same position would in exercising decision-making and oversight functions.61
The plaintiff must show facts to overcome the business judgment rule
presumption, and the directors will be held personally liable if they cannot then
prove that they exercised the requisite care.62 The Supeme Court of Delaware
recently reiterated the applicable liability standard related to a director’s duty
of care, which is “predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”63
The oversight function requires the directors to pay attention to the
“corporate systems and controls, policy issues and other recurring matters, as
well as discrete attention to matters suggesting a need for inquiry.”64 Directors
are required to actively participate in company decisions and to properly
inform themselves before making such decisions.65 In complying with this
duty, they should gather information from management, corporate committees,
or other experts employed by the company in advance to allow time for
reflection on the information before making a decision.66 Furthermore,
directors must ensure that compliance systems are in effect, and if they become
aware of any problems, they must make further inquiry to ensure management
is dealing with the problem appropriately.67 The duty of care requires a
director to be intimately informed about the decisions and business practices of
the company entrusted to her care. Recently the courts have spoken about a
duty of good faith and have inquired into a director’s good faith in their
fiduciary duty analyses.
III. THE PROGRESSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH IN THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE ANALYSIS
Historically, the director’s duty of good faith was “subsumed in a court’s
inquiry into the director’s satisfaction of her duties of care and loyalty.”68 If
the court found that the director did not satisfy one of those duties, there was
no need to determine whether there also was a violation of the duty of good
faith.69 Alternatively, if there was no breach of either of those duties it was

61. See id. at 8.
62. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 53–54.
63. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). Gross negligence in the
corporate context refers to “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard” for stockholders’
interest or “actions which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’” BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at
64–65 (citation omitted).
64. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 18, at 3.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id. at 8–9.
67. Id. at 9–10.
68. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 918.
69. Id. at 985.
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uncommon for courts to perform a separate inquiry on the issue of good faith.70
However, as a result of relatively new statutes in corporation law, the duty of
good faith has become an integral component in determining director liability
in recent decisions. The courts have also provided a definition of good faith as
it applies to corporate governance.
A.

The Definition of Good Faith

Several commentators have inquired into the definition of good faith and
its practical significance in a court’s analysis. A recent Delaware case cited
the Black’s Law Dictionary definition for bad faith as “not simply bad
judgment or negligence, but . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . different from the negative idea of
negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or ill will.”71 Additionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery
suggested that the
good faith iteration’s utility may rest in its constant reminder (1) that a
fiduciary may act disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal
pecuniary interest; and (2) that, regardless of his motive, a director who
consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may
suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.72

More generally, the overall concept of good faith is found in the typical
codification of director conduct, which requires a director to act with the
honest belief that she is acting in the best interests of the corporation.73
Accordingly, if directors act with this requisite good faith, courts still give
deference to their decisions, and are reluctant to second-guess their judgment.74
Several early cases laid the foundation for the good-faith principle that courts
apply today in the corporate context.

70. Id.
71. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199,
1208 n.16 (Del. 1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (5th ed. 1983)).
72. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
73. Veasey, supra note 15, at 444–45. A New York court described good faith as
an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition. It
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence
of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind and inner spirit and, therefore, may not
conclusively be determined by his protestations alone.
Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259–60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
74. Veasey, supra note 15, at 445.
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Evolution of the Good-Faith Standard

The beginning of the good-faith standard can be traced back to the early
Delaware case Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,75 which was the
first time that a Delaware court recognized the director’s duty to act in an
informed and prudent manner.76 In Graham, the plaintiffs could not prove that
the directors had actual knowledge of wrongdoing or even knowledge of facts
that should have put them on notice of the occurrence of illegal actions within
the corporation.77 The plaintiffs, therefore, argued that the directors were
liable for their failure to take reasonable steps to learn of and prevent the
activity.78 The court articulated that “[i]f [the director had] recklessly reposed
confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, ha[d] refused or neglected
cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or ha[d] ignored either willfully or
through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law
will cast the burden of liability upon him.”79 The court, however, stopped
short of imposing a duty upon the board to install a law compliance program
absent red flags.80 Even though the court did not impose liability in this case,
Graham heightened the duties expected of directors by requiring them to act in
a careful and prudent manner. While this case was groundbreaking, courts did
not, until recently, embrace the precedent for a heightened standard set forth in
Graham.81
Before Aronson v. Lewis,82 a 1984 decision, the expectations of directors
were unclear, and their legal obligation to the shareholders via their fiduciary
duties imposed almost no repercussions on them for misconduct.83 In Aronson,
the Supreme Court of Delaware emphasized the importance of a directorial
process that requires the board to avail itself of all available information before
making a decision in good faith, thus affirming the Graham decision.84 The
court articulated that directors could be held liable for gross negligence for
75. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
76. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 985 (1994).
77. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 130.
80. See id. at 130–31.
81. In fact, before the mid-eighties courts had applied the business judgment rule in a
manner to completely bar shareholder claims against directors for breaching their fiduciary duty
of care. See Horsey, supra note 76, at 977.
82. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
83. Professor George W. Dent, Jr. attributed the decline of enforcement to a
misunderstanding of the law. He stated that cases were dismissed under the rule before the court
even really inquired about whether or not the directors acted reasonably and with due diligence.
George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the
Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 647 (1981).
84. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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failing to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to
them.85 The significance of the Graham decision had largely been ignored
until the Aronson court reiterated the enhanced expectations of corporate
directors.86
The decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 87 resolved the issue concerning what
amount of inquiry would satisfy the informational component of decision
making. In Van Gorkom, shareholders brought a derivative suit against the
board for agreeing to a shareholder-approved merger that would have given the
shareholders a premium for their shares over the market price at that time.88
Although shareholders were to receive a price greater than fair market value,
the court imposed liability on the directors because they made the decision too
hastily (after only a two-hour meeting), without the appropriate information
available (they did not read the merger agreement), and without reasonably
attempting to ask the appropriate questions to get that information (they did not
try to find out how the agreed price was derived, nor did they hire their own
expert to give an opinion on an appropriate price).89 Similar to the Aronson
court, the Van Gorkom court required the directors to have all the information
reasonably available to them before making the decision.90
Many scholars at the time attacked the Van Gorkom holding, hailing it as
the worst decision in corporate history.91 Scholars feared that Van Gorkom
would lead to a decline in willing and qualified candidates for director
positions.92 Therefore, in response, many states enacted exculpatory clauses
that permit stockholders to include a provision in the certificate of
incorporation that protects directors from personal liability despite a breach of
fiduciary duty.93
85. Id.
86. Horsey, supra note 76, at 986.
87. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
88. Id. at 864–70.
89. Id. at 868–70.
90. Contrast this with ALI principles, which only require directors to be informed to the
extent that they reasonably believe to be appropriate under the circumstances. ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES §
4.01(C)(2) (1997).
91. See generally Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral
Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676
(2002). Some feared that the decision would lead to costly and time-consuming procedures that
would ultimately harm the shareholder, and others agreed with the directors’ conduct and
believed that it did not even rise to ordinary negligence let alone the requisite gross negligence.
Many also doubted the utility in analyzing a decision that presented a premium over market price
that would ultimately be voted on and decided by the shareholders anyway. See Gevurtz, supra
note 49, at 299.
92. See E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of
Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2003).
93. See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, following the corporate collapses of the late 1990s, spurred in
large part by deficient directors and management, the Court of Chancery
bolstered Graham in its decision in In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation.94 In Caremark, the court noted that even an ill-advised
decision would be protected assuming it was made from a process that was
“deliberately considered in good faith or was otherwise rational.”95 In dicta,
Chancellor Allen reiterated a statement made in Graham, namely that “absent
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no
reason to suspect exists.” 96 However, Allen took an extra step, a step the
Graham court was unwilling to take, and said that Graham could no longer be
interpreted to mean that a board had no obligation to create an informationgathering system and monitoring mechanisms to ensure corporate law
compliance.97 Allen stated that it was necessary for the board to assure itself in
good faith that information and reporting systems are accurately and promptly
providing the relevant information for the board to make an informed decision,
and that if the directors failed to do so they could be held liable for illegal
conduct.98 However, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith
that is a necessary condition to liability.”99 Although this analysis was dictum
in Caremark, Chief Justice Veasey has noted that the expectations of directors
have progressed from Graham to Caremark.100 The courts’ progression to
relying on the principle of good faith is not limited to cases involving fiduciary
duty, but it also stretches to takeover attempts.

94. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
95. Id. at 967 (holding that “[d]irector liability for a breach of the duty to exercise
appropriate attention may . . . follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that
decision was ill advised or ‘negligent.’” In addition “liability to the corporation for a loss may be
said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”).
96. Id. at 969 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)).
97. Id. at 969–70. But see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) (2002), which has been
adopted by many states and is closer to the Graham interpretation than Caremark. The section
states that a director may be held liable for inattention “when particular facts and
circumstances . . . materialize that” would put “a reasonably attentive director” on notice of the
need for further inquiry. See also id. § 8.01 official cmt. (“[D]irectors should not be held
personally responsible for actions or omissions of officers, employees, or agents of the
corporation so long as the directors have relied reasonably”).
98. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
99. Id. at 971.
100. Veasey, supra note 15, at 446.
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C. Good Faith in Takeovers
Although the good-faith standard has become more prominent in the last
few years, its evolution was also evident in the 1980s and 1990s during the
hostile takeover phenomenon.101 For example, as a result of that evolution,
courts apply the business judgment rule to a board’s decision to accept or reject
a takeover offer, and the board is not obligated to negotiate or to sell the
company simply because a premium offer has been made.102 Furthermore,
directors will be exonerated from any challenge if the board makes a goodfaith and informed decision that a sale is not in the company’s best interests.103
In fact, the board, as a fiduciary, is required to oppose any offer that it feels is
not in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.104
Despite the general deference in this area, business judgment rule
jurisprudence has gradually developed a more rigorous scrutiny of board
decisions involving defensive actions taken by the board to block a takeover.105
Courts require this enhanced analysis because of the possibility that a board
may be acting in its own interest, rather than those of the company and its
shareholders.106 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,107 the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the board’s basic duty of ensuring that its decisions
are in the best interests of the shareholders.108 However, in light of the
potential conflict of interest, the court imposed a more intrusive two-prong
test.109 First, the board must have “reasonable grounds for believing that a

101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995)
(holding that the board may deny a “third party’s unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer.”
(quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 n.13 (Del.
1994))); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989)
(holding that the board’s refusal of an offer is a valid decision under its business judgment).
103. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that
directors are free to decline to negotiate the sale of a company subject to the conditions of good
faith).
104. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (holding that “the
board had both the power and duty to oppose a bid it perceived to be harmful to the corporate
enterprise.”); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990).
105. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921.
106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
107. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
108. Id. at 955.
109. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921. The two-part test in Unocal was later
rearticulated by the court in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
45 (Del. 1994), where the court stated that “[t]he key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a)
a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision making process . . . including the
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the
reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.”
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danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”110 This prong requires
the board to inform itself fully, and any defensive action taken must be the
result of careful evaluation of the various alternatives available.111 The board
also must have responded in good faith to a perceived threat and not for the
purposes of entrenching itself in office.112 Second, the board must justify the
reasonableness of the tactics used in response to the threat the takeover posed
to the corporation’s interests. 113 The board will satisfy the Unocal
requirements “by showing good faith and reasonable investigation.”114 The
enhanced scrutiny standard created a mechanism for future litigation involving
defensive measures employed to resist a corporate takeover.
The progeny of Unocal continued to hold directors to a heightened
standard of conduct in regard to takeovers. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,115 the court developed a modified version of the
enhanced scrutiny test to deal with the issue of directors who were determined
to sell the corporation to a new owner.116 The Revlon court noted that if a sale
of the corporation is inevitable, the director’s duty changes from the
preservation of the company to the maximization of shareholder value.117
However, the directors are not always obligated to accept the highest bid, but
rather to seek out, in good faith, the best transaction that would maximize
shareholder interest.118

110. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1985). Threats sufficient to satisfy the standard include: “coercion, price
inadequacy, insufficient time or information for shareholders to assess price adequacy, the failure
to provide shareholders an option to remain equity holders in the corporation, and the effect of a
change in control upon corporate culture.” BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 251.
111. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 921.
112. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
113. Id. at 955. The Unocal court mentions Cheff v. Mathes, an early Delaware Supreme
Court case in which the court did not even give the board the business judgment rule presumption
of good faith. Instead, the directors were responsible for proving that they had a reasonable belief
that the shareholders’ interests were in danger and that their actions did not have the primary
purpose of self-interest. This holding, however, proved to have less impact than anticipated
because liability could only be imposed if self-interest was the board’s only purpose. STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 696 (2002).
114. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)).
115. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
116. Id. at 176.
117. See id. at 182. This duty arises in two situations: 1) when a corporation initiates a
bidding process to sell itself or reorganize, or 2) when a corporation, in response to an offer,
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks to break up the company. Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
118. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 71 (Del. 1989) (holding
that the board was properly motivated and acted in good faith in choosing between two bidders).
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Subsequent cases reiterated the authority of the board in making decisions
concerning mergers and takeovers.119 In addition, courts repeated the
deference to these decisions as long as they were made “within a range of
reasonableness” that included a good-faith analysis of alternatives available to
the board. 120 In general, the court will not second-guess the board’s judgment
if the directors’ defensive actions meet the standards discussed. However, the
business judgment rule protection is lost if the board breaches one of the triad
of fiduciary duties121 or does not meet the Unocal or Revlon standards.
Even if one of these standards is not met, the board’s decision is still not
necessarily invalidated but will instead be subject to review under the stricter
entire-fairness test.122 In contrast to the business judgment rule, the entirefairness test does not offer directors the benefit of any presumptions.123
Rather, the board must demonstrate the “utmost good faith” and “scrupulous
inherent fairness” of the transaction requiring the satisfaction of both fair price
and fair procedure.124 Recently, courts have made good faith the central
concept in corporate jurisprudence.
IV. RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH
The court’s determination of a director’s good faith has become central to
the duty of care and loyalty analyses. Due to the outcry of concern over the
potential effect of the enhanced duties expected of directors, many states
enacted protective provisions. One such example is section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, which allows shareholders to adopt a
provision that will exonerate directors from personal liability for violations of

119. See, e.g., Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154 (holding that “Delaware law confers the
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board
representatives. . . . [and t]hat duty may not be delegated to the stockholders.”).
120. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995).
[T]he ‘range of reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of directors for latitude in
discharging its fiduciary duties . . . when defending against perceived threats. [I]f the
board of directors’ defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is
within a ‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not substitute its judgment for the
board’s.
Id. (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del.
1994)).
121. Justice Horsey first observed the triad of fiduciary duties, which refers to the duties of
care, loyalty, and good faith, in his opinion in Cede & Co. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
122. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1377 n.18.
123. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (holding that the standard is
“uncompromising”).
124. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). See also Cede & Co., 634
A.2d at 361.
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the duty of care.125 However, if directors fail to act in good faith, they will not
enjoy the protection of this exculpatory provision and will be subject to
liability.126 In addition, the good-faith language is prevalent in several other
important corporate provisions. Section 141(e) of the Delaware Code allows
directors to rely in good faith on corporate books, officers, committees, or
properly chosen experts. 127 Also, directors may not be indemnified under
section 145 of the Delaware Code if they did not act in good faith. 128 In fact,
good faith has become the overarching concept in both inquiries of the duties
of due care and loyalty instead of being subsumed within them.129 A director’s
failure to exercise good faith would disqualify her from the shelter of the
protective provisions and the business judgment rule.
The courts have hinted at corporate governance reform that “mandates that
directors proactively inform themselves about corporate developments and
aggressively intervene to understand reported troublesome corporate behavior
that is not voluntarily brought before the board by management.”130 Vice
Chancellor Strine observed in an August 2002 article that, due to the recent
Caremark decision and corporate exculpatory charter provisions, courts will
focus on a director’s good faith instead of a gross negligence standard.131 In
fact, the recent trend in director scrutiny has seemingly merged the doctrine of
good faith and the duty of care because the duty of care presently adds little to
no practical significance to the directorial role.132
Due to the prevalent “good faith” language in the Delaware Code that
would take a director’s conduct outside of these rules’ protection, Delaware
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002).
126. See Veasey, supra note 15, at 447.
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a). Indemnification refers to the ability of a corporation to
reimburse a director, officer, employee, or agent for any “expenses (including attorneys’ fees),
judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement” that were incurred during a suit against her. Id.
See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 941–65, for a complete discussion of indemnification
principles.
129. In the comment of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act, the authors note:
director[s] shall act in good faith coupled with conduct reasonably believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation. This mandate governs all aspects of directors’ duties: the
duty of care, the duty to become informed, the duty of inquiry, the duty of informed
judgment, the duty of attention, the duty of loyalty, the duty of fair dealing, and, finally,
the broad concept of fiduciary duty that the courts often use as a frame of reference when
evaluating a director’s conduct.
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 106
(Jeffrey D. Bauman ed., 2003 ed.).
130. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 981.
131. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1386 (2002).
132. See generally Creighton Condon, Keeping the “Good” Faith: The Evolving Duties—and
Potential Personal Liability—of Corporate Directors, 7 No. 2 M & A LAW. 1 (June 2003).
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courts have recently focused on the good faith of the director. In addition,
courts have focused on whether directors’ fiduciary duty violations also were
made in bad faith, which has led to the inquiry of whether directors will be
held to an independent duty of good faith.133 Courts have also shown that
these exculpatory provisions will not be upheld in instances in which directors
“consciously and intentionally disregard[] their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we
don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate
decision.”134 Directors who consciously disregard risks or knowingly put their
heads in the sand to avoid taking action call into question their good faith.135
Since Aronson, Delaware courts have consistently held directors liable for
breaching their duty of care when acting in a grossly negligent manner
described as “a devil-may-care attitude or indifference to a duty amounting to
recklessness.”136 In recent cases, however, courts have made the distinction
between “gross negligence amounting to recklessness,” which is a due care
violation sheltered by the provisions, and “conscious disregard of known
risks,” or bad faith, which falls outside all of these protective provisions.137
This distinction is evident in three recent decisions involving derivative actions
against directors for breaching their fiduciary duties. In each case, the court
not only denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, but also precluded the
102(b)(7) provision, allowing shareholders to proceed with their case.
A.

Recent Cases Utilizing the Good-Faith Standard

The first example in the recent triad of derivative cases in which the court
relied on the good-faith standard is McCall v. Scott.138 In McCall, the directors
knew of schemes instituted by management to improperly increase revenue
and did nothing to quash the fraud or even discourage it.139 In addition,
directors even provided incentives for employees to commit fraud, which led
to lawsuits, loss of goodwill, and declines in stock value due to state and
federal investigations.140 The Sixth Circuit, applying Delaware law, found that
the directors’ fiduciary duties included not only due care and loyalty but also
the duty of good faith.141 The court further asserted that while duty of care

133. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 985.
134. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis
omitted).
135. Id.
136. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 986 (quoting William T. Allen et. al., Function
Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS.
LAW. 1287, 1300 (2001)).
137. Id.
138. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
139. Id. at 813–15.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 818.
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claims alleging that only grossly negligent conduct are precluded by the
102(b)(7) waiver provision, claims based on reckless or intentional misconduct
are not protected.142 The court found that if directors consciously disregarded
known risks, there would be a likelihood of liability for breach of fiduciary
duty.143 Furthermore, the duty of good faith may be breached where
stockholders suffer due to a director’s conscious disregard of known risks
because such actions cannot be made in good faith.144
Another example is In re Abbot Laboratories Derivative Shareholders
Litigation.145 In Abbot, the directors, over a six-year period, failed to fix safety
violations despite thirteen FDA inspections of its facilities that resulted in
continual notices of the problems being sent to the directors.146 The plaintiffs
presented facts that the directors were aware of the problems and took no
action to remedy them, leading to the largest civil fine ever imposed by the
FDA and the suspension of the company’s products.147 The Seventh Circuit,
following the reasoning in McCall, stated that a complaint, which sufficiently
pleads facts of bad faith by the directors, falls outside of an exculpatory
provision’s protection.148 Therefore, the court ruled against the directors
because their failure to act exhibited a lack of good faith.149
The most recent illustration, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,150
is a May 2003 decision in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The CEO of
Disney, Michael Eisner, hired Michael Ovitz, a longtime personal friend, to
become the company’s new president.151 In approving the appointment, the
board’s conduct was inappropriate for several reasons, including the fact that
the board met for less than an hour (and spent most of its time on two other
issues), relied on a summary of the employee agreement’s terms (which had
not been finalized at the time of the board’s meeting), and did not consult an
expert for advice on the compensation arrangement.152 In essence, the board
gave the CEO free reign to negotiate at will with a close friend without any
142. Id.
143. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001).
144. See id.
145. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
146. Id. at 799–801.
147. Id. at 809.
148. Id. at 811.
149. Id. The court reasoned that a “sustained and systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight,” in this case intentional in that the directors knew of the violations of law, took no
steps in an effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure to take any action for
such an inordinate amount of time resulted in substantial corporate losses, establishing a lack
of good faith.
Id. at 809.
150. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
151. Id. at 279.
152. Id. at 279–85.
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board scrutiny. In addition, after Eisner admitted that hiring Ovitz was a
mistake, he unilaterally negotiated a severance package worth $140 million
without the participation of the board.153 The board also failed in this
transaction because it did not insist on the use of an impartial attorney who
would have advised the board that it could seek a termination based on fault,
which would have saved Disney the exorbitant “pay-off” to Ovitz.154
The Disney court again focused on whether or not the board’s actions were
honest and made in good faith. At issue in Disney was executive
compensation, a matter that courts historically have refused to second-guess.
There is no bright-line dollar limit to executive compensation, and as
Chancellor Chandler noted “large, heavy ships can float.”155 In a recent article,
however, Chief Justice Veasey pointed out that there are limits that revolve
around the processes the board incorporates in coming to a decision and the
board’s good faith, which “requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a
disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for the corporate good,
but not caring for the well-being of the constituents of the fiduciary.”156
Veasey further stated that reckless or irresponsible conduct could lack good
faith even absent self-dealing or fraudulent conduct.157
The Disney court also noted that an exculpatory provision eliminating or
limiting liability did not apply to either a breach of the director’s duty of
loyalty to stockholders or acts or omissions not made in good faith or that
entail intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law.158 Even
though the court was reluctant to second-guess the decisions of independent
directors, “the facts belie[d] any assertion that [the Disney directors] exercised
any business judgment or made any good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary
duties they owed to Disney and its shareholders.”159 Essentially, the directors
“consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a
‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude.”160 The court concluded that the
directors were deliberately indifferent to acting in good faith and with
153. Id. at 283–85.
154. Id at 286–88.
155. Veasey, supra note 15, at 447 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d
342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
156. E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom
Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 850–51 (2003).
157. Id.
158. Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 286.
159. Id. at 287.
160. Id. at 289. See also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs.,
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *9, *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
The Elkins court used the Disney standard and denied several of the directors’ motions to dismiss
due to the fact that there was sufficient evidence that they entered into several agreements in
“blind faith”; therefore, their conduct was not in good faith and was not protected by exculpatory
provisions. Id. at *12, *15.
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appropriate care to advance corporate interests, thereby placing their conduct
outside the business judgment rule’s reach.161
The court also concluded that the facts supported an inference that Ovitz’s
negotiations of his employment and termination agreements breached his duty
of loyalty. While the court acknowledged his right to seek the best agreement
possible for himself, he had the duty of negotiating honestly and with good
faith so that he would not be advantaged at the shareholders’ expense.162
Disney, along with Abbot and McCall, makes it clear that intentional and
reckless conduct showing a disregard for obvious risks constitutes bad faith
and will not be protected by the business judgment rule or exculpatory
provisions. This new focus on directors’ good faith is a step in the right
direction to provide a tangible standard that directors can use as a model for
their own conduct.
V. GOOD FAITH: THE UTILITY IN A BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE ANALYSIS AND
PROMOTION OF BUSINESS
The focus on a director’s good faith provides a more comprehensible and
precise standard of review for courts to follow. The courts have been
inconsistent with their articulation of the exact standard of conduct that is
expected of directors. Many courts continue to look to Delaware for guidance
because Delaware incorporates the majority of corporations in America.
However, even Delaware has not provided a consistent definition for the
standard of care that will subject directors to liability. Over time, the standard
has gone through an array of principles including: “gross and palpable
overreaching,” “bad faith . . . or a gross abuse of discretion,” gross negligence,
fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion, and “reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the stockholders.”163 In addition, the review of whether
a decision was made in bad faith was limited to those decisions that seem so
far beyond reasonable judgment that they were “inexplicable on any ground
other than bad faith.”164
The recent focus on good faith simplifies the articulation of a director’s
fiduciary duties by merging the duties of care and loyalty. The business
judgment rule limits a director’s liability assuming she was disinterested and
161. Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 289.
162. Id. at 291.
163. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
164. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 37 (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig.,
542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). See, e.g., Muschel v. W. Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908
(Del. Ch. 1973) (holding that a gross disparity in price paid and a fair price for the stock of an
acquired corporation could be construed as beyond an error of judgment and arising to bad faith);
Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that a great
disparity in the value of assets given in comparison to the benefits the company received signals
bad faith).
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made an informed decision in good faith.165 One commentator broke down the
duty of good faith into three substantive elements.166 First, the director must
be disinterested in the transaction by “neither appear[ing] on both sides of the
transaction nor expect[ing] to derive any personal benefit from it in the sense
of self-dealing.”167 Second, the director must be independent and not
dominated by another person.168 The director is considered independent if she
can make her decision “based on the corporate merits of the subject before the
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”169 If the director
cannot exercise free judgment or is influenced by an interested party, she
cannot possibly act in good faith.170 Finally, the conduct cannot be
“egregious,” which is a decision made “that . . . no person of sound ordinary
business judgment would countenance.”171 As Chancellor Allen has observed,
the rare case that looks at the irrationality of a decision is really a way of
analyzing bad faith.172
Consistent with the purpose of the business judgment rule, the focus on a
director’s good faith gives deference to business decisions. The overall
premise of the business judgment rule is that, absent the egregious case of bad
judgment or when there is evidence of bad faith, courts will not second-guess
the soundness of business decisions.173 This idea is important because
exposing director decisions to any additional scrutiny would have a negative
effect on business as a whole. Directors would be inclined to be risk-averse
and constantly second-guess their own judgment if they knew that each
judgment could be unfairly scrutinized. Any judicial allowance for review
would upset the system of free enterprise and bold entrepreneurial spirit, which
has become the cornerstone of American business. Furthermore, judges are
not trained to make such decisions and have no place in reviewing business

165. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 3.
166. Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and
the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1248 (1986).
167. Id. at 1248 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
168. Id. at 1249.
169. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (holding that the business judgment rule will still insulate the
board’s decision from judicial review unless the plaintiff can show that a majority of the board
was interested and/or lacked independence. In order to prove the directors were not independent,
the plaintiff must establish personal or business relationships by which the directors are either
beholden to or controlled by the interested party).
170. Hansen, supra note 166, at 1249.
171. Id.
172. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (holding that “[t]he
presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the decision
under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially
inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’” (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542
A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988))).
173. See Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927).
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decisions as a whole, no matter how foolish the decision may appear in
hindsight.
The concentration on a director’s good faith eliminates the need for the
subjective determination of what conduct constitutes gross negligence in the
context of a duty of care inquiry. Corporate exculpatory provisions will
absolve a director of any liability, even if her conduct is grossly negligent, as
long as her good faith is uncompromised.174 Therefore, in practice the only
worthwhile inquiry in the context of a director’s duty of care is into the
director’s good faith. The oft-cited duty of care requirement, which mandates
that a director exercise the “amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances,” is misleading.175 The search
for directors who have been held liable for “negligence uncomplicated by selfdealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack.”176
In the decision-making context, the final result of a decision is not the
focus of a court’s analysis, and therefore, there is no need for a court to inquire
into whether a decision was one of “an ordinarily prudent person . . . in a like
position and under similar circumstances.”177 Rather, the process is the key
component, and a good faith undertaking by the directors is required.178 If a
lack of good faith yields an egregious result, the directors will not meet the
standards set forth by the business judgment rule.179
A case illustrative of a board decision in which the process was so foolish
that even the business judgment rule did not insulate it is Litwin v. Allen.180
The court held the directors of Guaranty Trust Company liable for the decision
to purchase $3 million of debentures.181 The purchase agreement gave the
seller the option to repurchase the debentures at the sale price within six
months.182 This option put the risk of loss on Guaranty Trust if the debentures
declined, which they did.183 In addition, Guaranty Trust did not realize any
potential for profiting because if the debentures appreciated, the seller could
exercise the option to repurchase.184 Therefore, the situation was a no-win for
Guaranty Trust. The court noted that while the director’s honesty was
unquestioned, honesty was not enough: “[T]here must be diligence, and that

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001).
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 242–43.
Hansen, supra note 166, at 1245.
Id. at 1246 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1248.
See Veasey, supra note 15, at 447.
25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
See id. at 699–701.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 698.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

594

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:571

means care and prudence, as well.”185 Some processes that yield a decision
may be so foolish that even the business judgment rule will not protect the
directors from judicial review; however, these cases are extremely rare.186
Nonetheless, Litwin stands as precedent for the idea that directors will be held
liable for making decisions that are beyond a range of reasonableness and that
are so egregious their good faith is compromised.187
Even out of the decision-making context, directors are only held liable for
obvious failures to exercise any oversight and supervision.188 A typical
example is Francis v. United Jersey Bank.189 In Francis, the director allowed
her two sons to use the company to make unlawful payments to themselves.190
The court found her liable because she exercised no attention at all to the
affairs of the corporation.191 The court stated that directors have a constant
obligation to inform themselves about the activities of the corporation and
must not ignore corporate misconduct only to claim that because they did not
see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look.192 Again, the precedent
set forth by Francis has a minimal reach that extends only to those directors
who remain oblivious to their duties and simply exercise no oversight.
The court should be cautious and broadly construe the good-faith standard
in favor of the director because it is not the job of the court to second-guess
business decisions, especially with the aid of hindsight. Shareholders are quick
to question the soundness of a business decision after the market tests its
utility; however, the good-faith standard should not be used to heighten the
degree of scrutiny for business decisions not complicated by conflicts of
interest. The heightened scrutiny of Unocal and its progeny, along with the
entire-fairness test articulated in Weinberger, are undoubtedly necessary in
transactions involving conflicts of interest; however, such a rigid standard has
no place in evaluating the conduct of good-intentioned and disinterested
directors. The good-faith standard can have a marked impact in corporate
jurisprudence and the corporate culture as a whole if used appropriately.

185. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). The court held in this case
that there was more than a “question of business judgment as to which men might well differ.
The directors plainly failed in this instance to bestow the care which the situation demanded.” Id.
186. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“There is
a theoretical exception . . . that some decisions may be so ‘egregious’ that liability for losses they
cause may follow even in the absence of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The
exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments . . . .”).
187. See Hansen, supra note 166, at 1249.
188. Id. at 1247.
189. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
190. See id. at 818–19.
191. See id. at 819–20.
192. Id. at 823.
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VI. WHERE CAN THE GOOD-FAITH ANALYSIS BE USED AND WHAT IS ITS
FUTURE IMPACT ON THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE?
The evolving standard of good faith will likely change the expectations of
the corporate culture. In the wake of Enron and other prominent corporate
catastrophes, the focus on a director’s good faith is a necessary component of a
court’s analysis. Good faith likely will become the central concept in the
judicial review of suits against directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. A
lack of good faith brings their conduct outside of both the business judgment
presumption and the protective provisions adopted by many states limiting the
director’s exposure to liability but still requiring that their actions be made in
good faith.
Although this Comment’s main focus is not on recent legislation, the
evolution of the good-faith concept can also be seen in several recently
adopted acts. These acts are a response to the lamentable behavior of many
directors who have been the subject of much controversy in the past few
years.193 Veasey noted “the utter failure to follow the minimum expectations
of the evolving standards of director conduct, the minimum expectations of
Sarbanes-Oxley, or the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules . . . might . . . raise a good
faith issue.”194 In addition, Veasey has observed that these requirements have
likely “enhanced the expectations of minimal director conduct.”195 It is the
role of the board to ensure all of the enhanced mandated “corporate
governance principles are carried out and followed through in good faith.”196
Overall, the heightened scrutiny on director conduct is likely to have a marked
impact in several areas, including: decreasing the pool of qualified candidates
for director positions, increasing litigation against current officials, restraining

193. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2138.
194. Veasey, supra note 15, at 446. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act holds directors to a heightened
degree of censure, oversight, and qualifications. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, § 101(c)–(e), 116 Stat. 745, 750–52 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.A.). The Board must have five financially literate members, and all of the members
must serve the corporation on a full time basis. § 101(e)(1), (3). This requirement ensures that
the directors have an intimate knowledge of the corporation’s dealings and any potential warning
signs. The Act also outlines several expectations now required of boards: 1) it must register
public accounting firms, 2) establish or adopt “auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and
other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers,” 3) conduct inspections of
accounting firms, 4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings, and impose appropriate
sanctions, 5) perform such other duties or functions as necessary, 6) “enforce compliance with
[the] Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the securities laws relating to the
preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants with
respect thereto,” and 7) “set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the staff of
the Board.” § 101(c).
195. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2145.
196. Id. at 2146.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

596

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:571

exorbitant compensation agreements to top executives, and proving a
formidable action in the upcoming litigation of many of corporate scandals.
A.

Decrease in the Pool of Qualified Candidates for Directorial Positions

The focus on the concept of good faith in the context of fiduciary duty
coupled with the newly enacted measures from Congress and the selfregulatory organizations is likely to shrink the pool of qualified candidates
willing to serve on corporate boards.197 In addition, even those directors who
still desire to serve on corporate boards will be limited in the number of boards
they can adequately and effectively serve on due to the increased time
demands on boards to focus on “accountability mechanisms related to
compensation, crisis management, accounting and auditing issues.”198 These
initiatives increase the responsibilities of directors and heighten the degree of
care expected of them. Therefore, many candidates will likely shy away from
taking on these duties. Hopefully the willing candidates that do fill these
positions will fulfill their duties responsibly and productively so that the
market will regain its faith in corporations.
Board members are usually well-educated and extremely sophisticated
individuals and expect to be compensated as such. The problem is that
sophistication and knowledge are useless if board members do not attend
meetings and do not care enough about the company to prod into the daily
occurrences in order to make decisions that will improve the company. The
recent corporate scandals, most notably Enron,199 provide a comprehensive
template on what directors should not do. The highly publicized corporate
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and others led to public outrage and corporate
governance reform, which inspired a host of emerging new requirements from
legislators, regulators, and the stock exchanges. The boards now face
unprecedented scrutiny, increased risks and responsibilities, and tough new
standards for their skills and independence.
197. Veasey, supra note 15, at 448.
198. Jerri Stroud, Boardroom Activism Drives Up Director Pay, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Aug. 8, 2004, at E4 (quoting Joel Seligman, Dean of Washington University School of Law).
199. Many of Enron’s board members missed a majority of the board meetings. Marianne M.
Jennings, Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper on Corporate
Governance—Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the “Yeehaw
Culture” in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387, 403 (2003). In addition, the board’s function
became one of merely putting its stamp of approval on transactions without making any inquiry
despite being warned about a transactions’ high risk. Id. at 405. Such incidents include: the
February 1999 audit committee meeting in which the board was told Enron’s accounting methods
pushed the limits of legally accepted methods, meetings between 1999–2001, in which the board
was told gross revenues were doubling and tripling, generated by off-the-book entities run by
their CFO, the board’s continual waiver of its own conflict of interest policy to run more off-thebook entities, and the fact that it accepted management’s word that a whistle-blower memo was
nothing and dismissed it with no investigation. Id. at 404–05.
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Enron board members averaged $380,000 in total cash and equity
compensation each year.200 This amount did not even include the money they
were paid for attending meetings during the year,201 nor did it include the
money board members made through indirect channels.202 The public became
outraged at such ludicrous numbers when the scandals were brought into the
limelight. However, even today the average corporate director at a large
corporation in the United States receives $154,016 per year in compensation
for her services.203 In comparison to Enron’s figures this amount may not
seem absurd, but compared to an average employee’s salary this figure is still
quite high, especially when one considers the fact that a director’s duties only
consist of a few days of work per year.
Directors’ salaries are also expected to double or triple in the next ten years
due to the fact that serving on a board has become a larger time
commitment.204 Therefore, there are still significant incentives for qualified
candidates to accept director positions; however, it is clear that more is
expected of them than the directorial inattention evident in the recent corporate
scandals. As one corporate director acknowledged: “It’s very serious
business,” and finally directors “are paying attention to what they should have
been paying attention to all along.”205 Those boards that did not pay attention
to fraudulent conduct and the corporate officials responsible for such dishonest
conduct will now face increased scrutiny and a heightened exposure to
discipline.

200. Reed Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2001, § 3, at 4.
201. Jennings, supra note 199, at 403.
202. Douglas M. Branson, Enron — When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1019 (2003). Enron
conducted many transactions involving conflicts of interest with its board members. Id. Such
incidents include: paying Lord John Wakeham, a chartered accountant, $72,000 per year for
consulting services; hiring Board member John Urquhart and his Connecticut based consulting
firm for $493,914 in 2000; giving $70,000 to Board member Charls Walker, a tax lobbyist, which
was paid to firms he controlled; buying equipment from National Tank Company, whose director
Herbert Winokur also served in the years 1997-2000; donating $50,000 to George Mason
University and its Mercatus Center headed by board member Dr. Wendy Gramm; and
contributing more than $600,000 to the Andersen Cancer Center, over which two Enron board
members, Dr. Charles LeMaistre and Dr. John Mendelson, had at various time presided as
president. Id.
203. Press Release, Pearl Meyer & Partners, Calm Before the Storm — Average Board Pay at
Largest 200 Companies Stays Flat at $154K (Mar. 27, 2003), at http://www.pearlmeyer.com/
prcurart35.html.
204. See Stroud, supra note 198 (opinion of Todd McGovern, regional compensation leader
with Mellon Financial Corp. of Pittsburgh).
205. Id. Gwendolyn King, director of Monsanto Co. and three other companies, opined about
the role of corporate directors in today’s corporate culture. Id.
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Increase in Litigation Against Current Officials

Courts are opening the door for increased litigation against directors and
officers, and corporate lawyers are likely to accept the challenge of
representing shareholders who lose assets as a result of dishonest corporate
conduct. Likely, the focus of litigation against corporate directors will
concentrate on inadequate oversight.206 The courts have made it clear that
exculpatory provisions will not protect directors’ conduct if it was so egregious
that it lacked good faith and was contrary to the best interests of the
shareholder.207 In addition, Delaware enacted new legislation that makes it
easier for stockholders to obtain books and records of the corporation if they
have a proper interest in obtaining information on the corporation’s
operations.208 This provision will make it easier for shareholders to examine
the exact steps and processes taken by the board in making decisions that
impact the corporation. An increase in the availability of information further
bolsters the recommendation to directors that they ensure the installation of
appropriate information systems in the company and avail themselves of all
possible information before making a decision in the company’s best interests.
Another possible impact of the recent focus on good faith is an increase in
litigation pursuing officers in fraud cases.209 Perhaps as a direct response to
the appalling conduct of many top officials, Delaware recently enacted
legislation that would subject officers to the personal jurisdiction of the Court
of Chancery in the same manner as directors.210 Therefore, stockholders will
likely have a cause of action against top officials involved in fraudulent
schemes or wasting company assets. In response, top officials should be
concerned with ensuring that their conduct can survive good-faith scrutiny.
Insurance carriers may also disclaim coverage due to the recent focus by
some courts upon the exclusions for willful or intentional misconduct.211
Corporations and directors protect themselves from personal liability through
such coverage; however, actions made in bad faith will likely not be protected.
Boards failing to meet these minimal requirements will likely be forced to pay
for their indiscretions out of their own pocket instead of relying on
indemnification or insurance. In fact, the move toward holding inept directors
personally responsible for failing to exercise the requisite care in their decision
making has recently become a reality as former directors of both Enron and
206. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2145.
207. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2003).
209. Veasey, supra note 15, at 448.
210. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2003).
211. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 983. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance
reimburses the corporation for any indemnification payment made to an officer or director and
also covers the officials in situations where the corporation does not offer indemnification.
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 941.
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WorldCom agreed to personally compensate shareholders for losses incurred
as a result of their failure to monitor the illegal activity within the
corporation.212 These settlements are “highly unusual” and reiterate the
premise that a director must carry out her duties with the utmost
professionalism and good faith or face exposure to potential personal
liability.213 The scrutiny on officials’ good faith could also spill over from the
area of decision making and into the relatively untouched area of executive
compensation.
C. Executive Compensation Agreements
The good-faith standard could have a substantial influence on litigation
involving executive compensation. The corporate culture saw a huge increase
in executive compensation in the 1990s, and the insatiable greed for lavish
indulgences permeated it at levels never before seen. Few questioned the
exorbitant payments being made to executives during the economic boom
because everyone was prospering; however, when the bubble burst, the lofty
salaries became an issue.
Many of Wall Street’s brightest stars such as Kenneth Lay of Enron,
Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco, and Bernhard Ebbers of WorldCom, who made
millions of dollars throughout the 1990s, plummeted back to reality as their
companies’ stocks crashed and their own names became headline news in
ongoing fraud investigations.214 Today, the public even views such prominent
executives such as Jack Welch of General Electric as “greedy robber barons”
despite the fact that it was only a few years ago that the market hailed them as
“entrepreneurial geniuses.”215 As shareholder wealth quickly disintegrated in
the bear market of 2000-02, the question of why these executives made so
much money was on everyone’s mind.
Recently, three corporate law scholars, Professor Lucien Bebchuk,
Professor Jesse Fried, and David Walker, attempted to answer the question that
so often came up in conversation.216 Their article theorizes that top officials
are so highly compensated because they exert so much control over their
companies and the boards of directors that they can siphon money to

212. Greg Farrell, Ex-Directors Could Pay Out of Own Pockets: Move in WorldCom Suit
Unusual, USA TODAY, January 7, 2005, at 3B; Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, Ex-Enron Officials
OK $168M Payment: 10 Ex-Directors to Contribute $13M, USA TODAY, January 10, 2005, at
6B.
213. Farrell, Ex-Directors Could Pay Out of Own Pockets, supra note 212.
214. Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L.
129, 130–31 (2003).
215. Id. at 131.
216. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
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themselves almost at will.217 Such a powerful and improper influence allows
the officials to dictate the terms of their own compensation, which will be the
highest amount they can take without triggering what the authors call public
“outrage.”218 In addition, the top officials will engage in “camouflage” to
conceal large payments from investors and minimize the possibility of causing
such an outrage.219
An example of camouflage includes stock options that tie executive
compensation to the company’s stock price but do not take any money directly
from the company.220 Instead, the executive is compensated by exercising her
options at well below the market price and profiting from the spread between
the prices. Such tactics led to several top officials looting their companies by
posting artificial profits and assets to keep the stock price up long enough for
them to sell their shares on the open market and make a significant profit just
before the stock plummeted.221 In fact, it seems that performance has little, if
anything, to do with how much money an executive can make in a year, which
is why even in the bear market many corporate officials were receiving
exorbitant paychecks. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out
“[t]he salary of the chief executive of the large corporation is not a market
reward for achievement,” but rather “a warm personal gesture by the individual
to himself.”222
The recent corporate scandals seemed to affirm the very premises that
these scholars had previously written about, and such foresight is not due to the
novelty of the thesis. The authors themselves point out that there is nothing
new to the ideas that many top officials are greedy, that they are not effectively
controlled by their boards, and that they overpay themselves for the services
they provide. Even in the wake of all the corporate scandals, in 2004 the
average CEO still received more than $9 million in compensation.223
There is a belief in the corporate culture that there is no limit to what
compensation committees can give top executives because it is nearly
impossible to judge the exact dollar value that a top executive has to the

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See id. at 754–56.
See id. at 756.
See id.
See id. at 762–63.
Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 889 (2003).
222. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ANNALS OF AN ABIDING LIBERAL 79 (Andrea D. Williams
ed., 1979).
223. CNNMoney, Report: More Cash for CEOs (April 4, 2004), at http://money.cnn.com/
2004/04/04/news/fortune500/ceo_pay/. According to the survey conducted by Pearl Meyer &
Partners, this figure is actually down eight percent from 2003. Id.
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company’s overall performance.224 There is no statutory limitation or certain
dollar amount that is too high; however, judicial review will likely focus on the
board processes for figuring compensation, which are governed by a duty of
good faith.225 This principle has been proven in the recent Disney case, which
is still ongoing in the Delaware Court of Chancery. It is possible that directors
could be held liable for approving a compensation agreement without first
taking appropriate measures to consider whether the agreement is in the best
interests of the corporation. The board should consult comparable officer’s
salaries and experts to determine what would be a fair agreement between the
corporation and the executive candidate. Failure to employ such methods
could call the board’s good faith into question.
The shareholder can also attack the terms of an executive compensation
arrangement on the grounds that it is so unfavorable to the corporation that no
director of ordinary sound business judgment would have voted in favor of it,
and it is therefore a waste of corporate assets.226 If reasonable persons could
differ as to whether a compensation agreement is favorable to the corporation,
it will generally be upheld under the business judgment rule.227 Again, the
good faith of the decision is an integral component of this analysis because “if
there [was] a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction
[was] worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste.”228 Disney involves a
claim for waste of corporate assets due to the large sums of money paid to
Ovitz for which the corporation received little if any benefit.229 If the Disney
board is held liable in this case, it would set a precedent that future boards need
to scrutinize the stipulations of executive compensation agreements and ensure
their fairness.
Thirty years ago a corporate insider wrote:
While ostensibly the seat of all power and responsibility, directors are
usually the friends of the chief executive put there to keep him safely in
office. They meet once a month, gaze at the financial window
dressing . . . listen to the chief and his team talk superficially about the
state of the operation, ask a couple of dutiful questions, . . . and adjourn
until next month.230
Hopefully, the focus on a director’s good faith along with the newly proposed
acts will spawn a resurgence of ethical conduct in corporations, and boards will
224. See Veasey, supra note 5, at 2141. But see Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch.
1962) (noting that while a large amount of deference is ordinarily given to decisions of directors,
it is clear that there are compensation payments so large that they are unconscionable).
225. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2141.
226. Saxe, 184 A.2d at 610.
227. Id.
228. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
229. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003).
230. ROBERT TOWNSEND, UP THE ORGANIZATION 49 (1970).
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assume the duty of maximizing shareholder value, which is supposed to be
their primary concern. While the standard of good faith’s long-term impact on
executive compensation is unknown, these new initiatives should prove
influential in the upcoming litigation of the corporate scandals.
D. Litigation Involving Corporate Scandals
The good-faith analysis could prove to be instrumental in the upcoming
litigation of the economic disasters of Enron, WorldCom, and others. In
WorldCom, for example, the Thornburgh Report231 alleges that WorldCom
used fraudulent accounting to cover up financial problems and failed to
monitor or influence the actions of management.232 The board members
apparently continually approved actions with little or no inquiry into their
potential impact on the corporation.233 Therefore, their primary goal was to
please industry analysts by meeting or beating earnings estimates, which
caused a rise in stock price.234 Similarly, the Powers Report235 alleges that
Enron was managed toward the market expectations in an attempt to take
advantage of short-term profits.236 In addition, Enron allegedly met its
earnings estimates by using an elaborate business scheme wrought with
conflicts of interest and potential fraudulent conduct.237 The common thread in
both of these debacles, and likely others, is that officers abused the
corporation’s assets and directors were content to watch and allow it to
happen.238 As recent cases have shown, such conduct is not appropriate and
could subject directors to liability. In addition, with the enactment of new
provisions geared at officials, greed-driven management could also be subject
to similar censure.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the good-faith analysis does impose a heightened level of directorial
conduct, it is important to note that the requirements are not unreasonable. The
judicial review in this area is not intended to minimize risk-taking or to raise
individuals’ concerns over the increased liability exposure. The business
231. First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, In re WorldCom
Inc. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-15533 (AJG)), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf.
232. See id. at 8.
233. Id. at 6–7.
234. See id. at 8.
235. William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.
236. See id. at 151.
237. Id. at 151–52.
238. Veasey, supra note 5, at 2138.
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judgment rule remains unchanged and remains a formidable barrier protecting
directors’ decisions from second-guessing by the courts even for gross
negligence or recklessness where their wrongdoing is unwitting or
unintentional. The court’s job is to analyze the processes incorporated by the
directors in their decision making and oversight duties.239 This is the area in
which the expectations of directors have consistently evolved, and presently
the focus is on the good faith of the board in initiating appropriate processes.240
The good faith concept is an essential component in director conduct and
must be considered when analyzing directors’ processes and motivations to
ensure they are “honest and are not disingenuous or reckless.”241 The concept
of good faith is not fully developed in case law; however, it is clear that
“reckless, disingenuous, irresponsible, or irrational conduct . . . [can] implicate
concepts of good faith.”242 The recent decisions in McCall, Abbott, and Disney
represent egregious breakdowns in board review and inaction to issues of
which the board was aware.
The newly proposed provisions enacted by Congress and self-regulatory
organizations coupled with the new focus of good faith in the fiduciary duties
of both officers and directors will hopefully improve the current state of
corporate ethics.
There are also commentators who have made
recommendations for improving the ethical situation of corporate governance.
The Principles of Corporate Governance adopted by the Business
Roundtable243 in May 2002 and the recommendations of the ABA Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility244 are key guides for the aspirations of corporate
governance. The heightened standards only impose a duty to exercise goodfaith judgment in business decision making.
[I]ndependent directors who exercise skepticism, diligence and a willingness to
ask tough questions, to insist that management present to the board (or an
appropriate committee) matters of potential materiality to the corporation, who
fully inform themselves with respect to matters presented to the board
(including decisions not to act), and who seek the advice of independent
experts (including executive compensation experts) when it is appropriate to
do so, should continue to enjoy all the protections afforded by the business
judgment rule and exculpatory clauses.245

239. Id. at 2146.
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available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/document.cfm/704.
244. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (Mar.
31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf.
245. Fleischer & Sussman, supra note 4, at 983.
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Courts have made it clear, however, that directors will be held liable for a lack
of good faith where they consciously or intentionally disregard their duties.246
The potential difficulty for directors is the manner in which judges and
juries may evaluate their conduct in the context of good faith given the
imprecise and subjective boundary between good faith and bad faith.247
Therefore, caution is left to the courts to only impose liability in cases
involving obviously egregious or illegal conduct. Courts should not impose a
rigid standard on disinterested decisions because the effect upon the corporate
culture would be negative, leaving unqualified and risk-averse individuals in
positions that demand bold risk-takers. Recent corporate greed forced a shift
within the court systems to hand down harsher punishments for improper
conduct; however, heed should be taken to ensure the pendulum does not shift
too far in the other direction or the results could be equally disastrous.
CG HINTMANN*

246. Id. at 990.
247. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).
*
J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2005. I would like to thank Professor
Thomas L. Greaney for his assistance in the writing of this Comment. I would also like to thank
my parents, Carl and Susie Hintmann, and my sister, Brooke Hintmann, for their unconditional
and continued love and support.

